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Abstract
Evidence on adverse selection in slave markets remains inconclusive. A neces-
sary prerequisite is that buyers and sellers have different information. We study
informational asymmetry on the slave markets through notarial acts on public slave
auctions in Mauritius between 1825 and 1835, involving 4,286 slaves. In addition to
slave characteristics, the acts document the identities of buyers and sellers. We use
this information to determine whether the buyer of a slave was related (e.g. a rela-
tive or a spouse) to the original slave owner, and thus most likely better–informed
than other bidders. Auction–theoretic models predict that bidding should be more
aggressive when informed bidders are present in open-bid, ascending auctions, such
as slave auctions. By proxying informed bidders by related bidders, our results con-
sistently indicate that this is the case, pointing toward the presence of information
asymmetry in the market for slaves in Mauritius.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Issues and motivation
According to Akerlof (1970), four necessary conditions are needed for adverse selection.
First, and foremost, one party to the sale should be more informed than the other. Second,
the quality of the product or service being sold should be valuable to both parties. Third,
price should not be set by the more informed party. Finally, uncertainty should not be
completely dissipated by extra-trading arrangements, such as warranties or litigation
practices.
This paper looks at the first of these four prerequisites in the particular context
of slave markets. More specifically, we ask whether or not informational asymmetries
between buyers and sellers might have been present in Mauritian slave auctions of the
early Nineteenth century. Clearly, as the null hypothesis of no informational asymmetry
is tantamount to a null of no adverse selection, this paper is also indirectly concerned
with the latter.
At first glance, the market for slaves would certainly appear to satisfy the necessary
Akerlof conditions for adverse selection. First, buying a slave remained a risky investment
in which the buyer was likely at an informational disadvantage compared to the seller
(Fede, 1987; Wahl, 1996). A slave-owner would undoubtedly have had more time to assess
the productive abilities of a given slave.1 Second, with the exception of slaves bought for
manumission, the vast majority of slaves that were sold went from one productive activity
1Although professional slave traders might not have had this informational advantage, the usually
long periods between taking charge of a slave and final sale would have given them time to assess
temperament, propensity to flee, resistance to illness, . . . . For example, Freudenberger and Pritchett
(1991) estimate a modal duration of two to three months for interstate trade toward the New Orleans
market.
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to another. Unless involving an important change of type of work (e.g. from field hand
to skilled work), sellers and buyers would presumably value the same characteristics.
Third, slaves were usually sold in competitive markets (Freudenberger and Pritchett,
1991), thereby limiting the scope for market manipulation by informed sellers. Finally,
although much more complex than commercial law, the law governing slave sales was
generally unable to eliminate the negative effects of information asymmetry completely
(Wahl, 1996).
Nonetheless, although adverse selection is likely to have been present in slave markets,
the empirical evidence concerning its incidence remains inconclusive. On the one hand,
Greenwald and Glasspiegel (1983) contend that adverse selection, and consequently in-
formation asymmetry, were empirically important. Studying the New Orleans market
for local and imported slaves they rely on the origin of the slave as an observable seller
characteristic to gauge the degree of adverse selection. Greenwald and Glasspiegel (1983)
conjecture that owners from low-productivity areas (e.g. Old South, or Border States)
would have had a higher marginal propensity to sell and therefore no interest in keeping
only the best slaves and selling the low-quality ones. In comparison, owners from high-
productivity Louisiana would cull bad slaves for resale purposes. Consequently, prices for
imported slaves in the New Orleans market would be higher than for local slaves. Their
empirical results, as well as those of Choo and Eid (2004), confirm this intuition.
However, Pritchett and Chamberlain (1993) criticize the conjecture that higher prices
for imported slaves reflected adverse selection. First, they argue that one setting in which
adverse selection ought to be minimized was that of estate sales where assets (including
slaves) were liquidated following the death of the owner. In comparison, voluntary sales
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should be more subject to the practice of culling bad slaves and therefore exhibit lower
prices. Yet, they find no statistically significant difference between prices observed during
estate and voluntary sales. Instead, Pritchett and Chamberlain (1993) suggest an alter-
native explanation for the difference in the prices of imported versus local slaves. If a fixed
transportation cost is applied to an imported slave, irrespective of the slave’s quality and
if prices are positively related to quality, then clearly the relative prices of high-quality
slaves will decrease with respect to those of inferior ones. Slave buyers would therefore
have responded to this fall in the relative price of high-quality slaves by demanding more
of them (Pritchett and Freudenberger, 1992; Pritchett and Chamberlain, 1993). The
higher prices fetched by imported slaves on the New Orleans market simply reflected the
fact that they were of higher quality compared to local slaves and did not result from an
adverse-selection discount applied against local sellers.
Hence, the debate on the presence of adverse selection on slave markets remains
unresolved. Whether or not adverse selection in general, and informational asymmetry
in particular, were indeed present does matter to the extent that not taking it into account
may bias evaluations of the profitability of slavery. Under perfect markets, the price of
any productive asset should reflect the expected discounted value of future dividends.
In the context of slavery, these dividends are simply the value marginal product of the
slave net of costs. Under informational asymmetry, this valuation breaks down, and
prices no longer reflect fundamentals. It then becomes hazardous to infer the productive
capacity of the general slave population from the market prices of slaves who might
actually be inferior ones culled by their owners (e.g. Greenwald and Glasspiegel, 1983;
Choo and Eid, 2004, among others). Since profitability is at the root of the viability of
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the slavery institution (Fogel, 1989; Fogel and Engerman, 1974), a further look at this
issue is certainly warranted.
This paper proposes to address the issue of adverse selection from the different per-
spective of its necessary prerequisite of information asymmetry. If information is symmet-
ric, then clearly the conditions necessary for adverse selection are not met. Buyers and
sellers share a common information set and competitive markets will ensure that prices
correctly reflect the fundamentals of slave ownership. If information is asymmetric, then
adverse selection is possible, but not proven.
We depart from previous analysis in at least three important ways. First, we focus on
a slave market which has received comparatively less attention: that of early nineteenth
century Mauritius. Second, we analyze adverse selection from the different perspective of
information asymmetry, drawing on an auction-theoretic background. Finally, we resort
to a rigorous estimation and inference framework to gauge the importance of informational
asymmetry.
1.2 Methodology and results overview
Although Mauritius remained an important slave colony of the French, and, beginning in
1810, of the British, until slavery was finally abolished in 1835, Mauritian slavery has not
been as extensively studied as its American counterparts.2 Despite distance, Chenny et al.
(2003) show that Mauritian slavery displayed remarkable parallels with its better-known
counterparts elsewhere. Valuation of physical strength, skills and reproductive capacities
2It is estimated that 85% of its population of 78,000 were slaves in 1807. See Burroughs (1976),
Benedict (1980), Nwulia (1981) Barker (1996), Teelock (1998), Scarr (1998), Valentine (2000) and Allen
(1999, 2001) for historical and sociological discussions and bibliographies on Mauritian slavery in par-
ticular. See Clarence-Smith (1989), and Scarr (1998) for discussions of the Indian Ocean slave trade in
general.
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were just as prevalent as those found in the Americas (Mancall et al., 2001; Bergad et
al., 1995; Newland and San Segundo, 1996; Kotlikoff, 1979, 1992, among others). On
the other hand, compared to the New Orleans market, the Mauritian slave market can
safely be regarded as purely local. On this small island of 720 square miles, slave imports
were effectively banned by the British. The implications are that variations in the prices
paid for slaves could not be attributed to differences in quality induced by transportation
costs, thereby addressing the critique by Pritchett and Chamberlain (1993).
In order to study the Mauritian slave market, we augment and complement the data-
base introduced by Chenny et al. (2003). This database initially consisted of detailed
notarial acts on auction sales of slaves over the period 1825-1827. In Section 2, we extend
the period covered to include the years up to 1835, for a total of 580 auctions involving
over 4,200 slaves in the primal data base. Our database includes detailed information on
slaves’ characteristics (ethnicity, gender, age, skills, bundle composition). Importantly,
for a subset of slaves sales, it also contains transactional data on the motivation for the
sale, as well as on the identities of the seller and buyer. This allows us to differenti-
ate between voluntary and involuntary (i.e. succession, bankruptcy) sales. Moreover, a
careful analysis of the notarial acts allows us to gauge the degree of parental relationship
between the seller and buyer. This variable is a key ingredient of our empirical evaluation
of information asymmetry.
Heuristically, it may be argued that a close parental (or business) relationship with
the owner could lead to more and better information on the slave’s characteristics. Fur-
thermore, if we take into account the fact that the Mauritian market was local and that
auctions were publicized well in advance, it appears reasonable to suppose that these
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seller-bidder ties would have been public information. Observing that a relative or part-
ner of the original owner was bidding for a slave at the auction could signal to the market
that this particular slave was of high quality. Clearly, a related bidder could also try to
acquire the slaves for other, more personal reasons that are unrelated to a slave’s pro-
ductive characteristics (e.g., personal attachment, manumission purposes, . . . ). In the
former case, competitive bidding would probably have been more aggressive, in the lat-
ter, it should not have been affected by the related bidder’s participation. Put differently,
any informational asymmetry regarding a slave characteristic valued by all bidders (com-
mon value) should have been reflected in a slave’s price; information asymmetry related
to a slave characteristic valued only by a particular bidder (private value) should not.
To substantiate this claim and to construct our empirical test, we use the interdepen-
dence of bidding behavior in public auctions where information is asymmetric and where
the good being auctioned has both a common and a private value. In this setup, the
behavior of better-informed bidders will affect that of others who infer the quality of the
good from the actions of the formers. The auctions literature has long recognized that
this environment is well suited for the analysis of informational asymmetry (e.g. Milgrom,
2004; Maskin, 2004, among others).
We resort to a well-known theoretical model of English auctions in Section 3.1. The
framework, developed by Wilson (1998) and later extended by Hong and Shum (2003),
considers open-bid ascending auctions characterized by informational asymmetries among
bidders and by private and common valuation and it is particularly appropriate for the
analysis of slave markets. Importantly, the Wilson (1998) model derives closed-form so-
lutions for the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium bids under log-normal distributions for values
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and signals. We can extend this model to our particular setting by characterizing an
informed (related) bidder as one with a perfect signal on the slave’s common value but
who nonetheless also values the slave for personal motives. In the Wilson (1998) model,
individual signals and valuations are not observed, but distributional assumptions gov-
erning these signals and valuations are considered public information. This means that
the identity of the informed bidder would be known, as was likely the case in our setting.
Although analytical expressions for the equilibrium bidding strategies are derived, the
exact role of the informed-bidder assumption is difficult to extract. We therefore resort
to numerical analysis in Section 3.2. Using Monte-Carlo experiments, we compute the
ex-post distribution of equilibrium bids while taking into account parametric uncertainty.
Our results indicate two clear and intuitively-appealing outcomes. First, the presence of
the informed bidder systematically leads to more aggressive bidding (Result 1). When
the informed bidder exits the auction, the market interprets this as a bad signal on the
auctioned good’s common value and bids fall accordingly, until this effect is eventually
subsumed by the additional information revealed in subsequent bidding rounds. As we
increase the uncertainty surrounding the weight of personal motives in the informed
bidder’s total valuation, the bid premium is reduced but still remains positive. Hence
the auction-theoretical model result reveals that bids (and consequently) prices should be
higher when an informed bidder is present. Secondly, the informed bidder ends up paying
a higher equilibrium price in those instances where he does win the auction (Result 2).
In the empirical analysis of Section 4, we attribute more information to personal seller-
bidder ties and associate an informed bidder with a related bidder. Our data set does not
contain information on all instances where related bidders participated in slave auctions.
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However, we observe cases where related bidders made the winning bid and subsequently
recorded the sale with the notary. It is thus unlikely that these sales were motivated by
market manipulation on the part of those entitled to the proceeds of the auction. Hence,
testing Result 2 is tantamount to testing whether slave prices were effectively higher when
a related buyer ended up buying the slave.
Consequently, we specify an hedonic pricing econometric model of log prices, using
slave characteristics (ethnicity, age, skills, the presence of children in bundle and gender)
as well as seasonal and time dummies as control variables. We augment the specification
with a binary variable indicating whether or not the buyer is related to the original
owner. We interpret a positive premium on this variable as indicating the presence of
informational asymmetries.
The estimated parameters presented in Section 4.2 all have the desired signs: prices
are higher for ethnic groups considered more productive, are bell-shaped in age, increase
with skills and the presence of children and in peak sugar cane production seasons and
years. Our theoretical prediction in Result 2 is confirmed whether or not we control
for potential endogeneity in the related-buyer variable or for the fact that it is a discrete
variable: the premium on the related buyer is positive, indicating that the null hypothesis
of symmetric information is rejected. Various additional robustness checks only confirm
this result.
As mentioned earlier, the presence of information asymmetry can be considered as
prima facie, although inconclusive evidence for adverse selection. We consequently com-
pare voluntary and involuntary sale prices in the spirit of Pritchett and Chamberlain
(1993). We find that prime-aged male field hand slaves fetched a 45% premium when
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sold in succession, as opposed to voluntary sales. We might therefore be tempted in
concluding that adverse selection is indeed present in the Mauritian slave market. How-
ever, a careful analysis of samples also reveals a fundamental difference between the two
markets: related buyers are absent from voluntary sales and active in involuntary sales.
As our theoretical and empirical results show, their sole presence is sufficient to induce
more agressive bidding. Consequently, the higher prices in involuntary sales likely reflects
self -selection, and not necessarily adverse selection.
2 Data
The information on the sale of Mauritian slaves is obtained from the notarial acts in
the General Inventory of Notaries (group NA) filed in the Mauritius Archives located in
Coromandel, Mauritius. Under Mauritian colonial law, notaries played a key role in the
public auctions of slaves (Government of Mauritius, 1824, Proclamation of July 16, pp
122-125). In particular, notaries certified the ownership titles of the sellers, recorded the
list of slave characteristics, as well as the motivation for the sale. They subsequently
publicized and organized the public auction. These auctions took place as oral (open)
ascending bids, following a slave inspection period.
Following the auction, the notaries recorded transactional information between the
seller and the buyer of the slave, including the slave’s price and observable characteristics
as well as the name of the buyer. In what follows, we focus exclusively on sales conducted
through public auctions and abstract from private person-to-person sales for which we
have no recorded information.
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We build on the database first introduced by Chenny et al. (2003) who used the
notarial acts for 1825 to 1827. They considered a sample of 152 auctions involving the
sale of close to 1,300 slaves. We extend the period covered up to January 1835, for a total
of 580 auctions involving 4,286 slaves in our primary data set. Even though other auctions
were also held over that period, slaves were actually sold only during those auctions in
our sample. These sales were recorded in the notarial acts of fifteen notaries described
in Table 1. Most were operating from the capital, Port-Louis. One notary, Alexandre
Bonnefin, accounts for 26% of all auctions and 20% of all slaves sold during the whole
period. Three notaries were active up to 1829 and we found no record of sales which they
would have performed afterwards.
The notarial acts contained limited information on the slave buyer’s and seller’s char-
acteristics, and no information on the actual bidding process (e.g. number, identities
and occupations of participants, number of bids, . . . ). However, the acts contain detailed
information on slaves being auctioned. Hence, the slave’s gender was recorded either ex-
plicitly or implicitly.3 Moreover, a slave’s age and ethnicity were also reported. Following
contemporaneous descriptions, slaves’ ethnic groups were classified as Creoles (born on
the island), Malagasy, Mozambiques and Indians (including Malays). Table 2 verifies our
sample’s representativeness of the slave population in Mauritius by comparing it with the
1826 partial census data from the Greffe de l’Enregistrement des Esclaves in the Mauri-
tius Archives (Teelock, 1998; Valentine, 2000). Overall, gender, ethnicity, as well as age
distributions by ethnic group in our sample are quite close to those obtained from the
3For example, the acts written in French distinguish between vendu (male) and vendue (female).
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census. We therefore conclude that our sample is reasonably representative of the general
slave population.
We use the Telfair (1830)’s occupational classification to characterize a slave’s work.
We aggregate slave occupations into three categories: laborers, agriculture and sea-
related; household slaves; and skilled slaves (see the notes to Table 3 for a more complete
description). Table 3 reports the average prices across gender, occupation and ethnic
group. Our main findings may be summarized as follows: (i) female slaves consistently
fetched lower prices; (ii) price differences across ethnic groups are significant, with Creoles
fetching the highest prices; and (iii) premiums are associated with skilled occupations.
These findings are consistent with those of Chenny et al. (2003) for the 1825-1827 period.
Slaves on the secondary market were either sold voluntarily by their masters or sold
involuntarily following their owner’s bankruptcy or death (succession sales). Under the
French Civil Code (adapted for Mauritius under Code Decaen, 1804), following a bank-
ruptcy, all the assets (including slaves) of the individual or company had to be liquidated
through an auction. Succession laws (also specified in the Civil Code) prescribed that
the succession should be divided among heirs following the death of the owner(s). Com-
plete liquidation of assets through an auction was automatic whenever a heir was minor,
absent or legally ineligible. Similarly, auction sales would have been organized whenever
heirs failed to reach an agreement concerning the valuation and distribution of the assets
among themselves. In this case, the value of the proceeds from the auction would have
been divided among the heirs.
When the reason for the auction could not be obtained from the notarial acts, either
because it was not documented or the reason was illegible because of the deteriorated
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condition of some documents, the motivation for the sale was classified as unknown.
In Table 4, the vast majority (77%) of auctions took place to liquidate the estate of a
deceased person, while only 9% were because a slave owner voluntarily wanted to sell his
or her slaves. The remaining auctions occurred because of bankruptcy.
Finally, each notarial act gives the name of the person who initiated the sale, the
name of the original owner and the name(s) of the buyer(s). In the case of succession
sales, each notarial act also lists the name of all the heirs, as well as any other individual
who is entitled to some part of the proceeds of the sale.4 This allow us to determine
whether or not buyers and sellers are related or not. We formally define related parties
as follows:
Definition 1 A buyer is said to be related to a seller whenever family or business ties
link the two parties.
To better understand how we proceeded to classify sales between related and unrelated,
an example might be useful. On July 2nd 1826, notary Dubor (NA 63) auctioned the
estate of deceased sieur Deville, a police commissioner (Commissaire civil et de police)
in the town of Pamplemousses located in the north of Mauritius. Sylvain Chauveau, the
testament executor, is recorded as the seller. The estate consisted of 12 slaves: 2 mothers
with their children (1 and 3 in each case), 2 skilled males (cook and carpenter), 2 female
laundresses, 1 female seamstress and 1 female domestic worker. All the slaves, except the
cook Caramouche and the female domestic worker Zaize, were purchased by the wife of
the deceased sieur Deville. The widow is obviously related to the original slave owner.
Caramouche was purchased by Hypolite Dupery for whom we could not find any link
4This would be the case for example if there were any creditor.
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with either sieur Deville or anyone else mentioned in the notarial act. As for Zaize, she
was purchased by G. Deville. Although the latter has the same last name as the deceased,
(s)he is not mentioned anywhere in the notarial archive as being related to the deceased
slave owner. We code such a sale as the buyer and seller having the same names and
being possibly related.5
We repeated the above procedure for each slave. Given that mothers were sold
together with their younger children under Code Noir and that we exclude voluntary
bundling of adult slaves, we are left with a usable sub-sample of 3,307 sales. The distri-
bution of the potential link between the buyer and seller is reported in Table 5. We find
a link between buyers and sellers for 1,003 slaves (3,307-2,304). In the case of succession
sales, conditional on being related to the deceased, the widow(er) is the modal buyer.
The second group of related buyers is composed of the former owner’s children. The share
of related buyers is lower in the case of bankruptcies (4.6%) or voluntary sales (12.6%)
than in succession sales (38.5%). In the case of voluntary sales, the modal related buyer
is the original owner himself (14 purchases).6 This highlights a fundamental difference
between voluntary and involuntary sales in our sample. Related buyers (other than origi-
nal owner) were active in involuntary sales and almost completely absent from voluntary
sales. Unrelated buyers were active in both.
5For robustness reasons, we also assumed that individuals with the same last name were unrelated,
without any qualitative change in our results.
6Note that, as was the case in New Orleans (Freudenberger and Pritchett, 1991), the original owner
could buy back his own slaves. These owners may have decided to buy back the slave given that the
proposed bid was less than their reservation value, or, more likely, in order to cancel prior sales and
return purchase price to the buyer.
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3 Theoretical analysis
This section first characterizes an auction model applicable for the analysis of slave mar-
kets. We then describe the theoretical predictions of one such model yielding closed-form
equilibrium bids.
3.1 A relevant auction model for Mauritian slave auctions
The main elements characterizing Mauritian slave auctions can be summarized as follows:
1. Slave auctions are public, with oral ascending bids.
2. Valuation of the slave might involve personal (e.g. love, affection, . . . ) as well as
purely productivity-related motives.
3. Information is unlikely to be symmetric across buyers and sellers, and across bidders.
One setting which is particularly well-suited for our analysis is the open-bid, single-good,
ascending English auction model, with private and common value and informational
asymmetry across bidders. Allowing for both private (i.e. personal) and common (i.e.
productivity) value is particularly useful in that bidders can learn something about the
quality of the good during the bidding process that can change their reservation prices
(Milgrom, 2004; Maskin, 2004). It is natural to believe that oral English auctions may
introduce such interdependence in individual values.7
7In the presence of interdependent or common values, the analysis of efficiency is more complicated.
However, Maskin (1992) and Krishna (2003) show that an equilibrium, with one-dimensional signals,
can still be efficient in ascending auctions with interdependent values and asymmetric bidders (different
value functions) if interpersonal crossing conditions hold. When signals are multidimensional, efficiency
is no longer possible (for a general proof of inefficiency see Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001)).
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One important contribution for empirical studies on auctions with private and com-
mon components is that of Wilson (1998). Like many authors in this literature (Milgrom
and Weber, 1982; Krishna, 2003, among others), Wilson (1998) considers a specific case
of English auctions labeled as the button (or Japanese) auction in which the dropping-out
decision is both public and irrevocable. Under the joint assumption of log normal, mul-
tiplicative values and information asymmetries, the equilibrium strategies are log-linear
and can be computed as a function of the chosen parameters.8
Specifically, agents denoted i = 1, . . . , N are characterized by a valuation (common
and private) Vi and a signal (valuation plus noise) Xi concerning an object sold at an
ascending, open-bid auction. Each round of the auction consists in agents submitting
bids, with the lowest bid being dropped out and a new round being started. At each
round k, agents can observe the signal of the exiting bidder, but need to infer that of the
N − k other bidders who remain active. Given price P , the equilibrium bidding strategy
of agent i at bid round k, βki , must satisfy:
P = E[Vi | X1 = (βk1 )−1(P ), . . . , XN−k = (βkN−k)−1(P ), XN−k+1, . . . , XN ], (1)
for i = 1, . . . , N−k. Under general monotonicity conditions, it can be shown that such an
equilibrium exists and is obtained by solving (1) for the N − k inverse bidding functions
(βkN−k)
−1(P ) (Hong and Shum, 2003, Proposition 1, p. 331).
Importantly, it is possible to derive closed-form expressions for the Bayesian-Nash
equilibrium bidding functions when the stochastic process is log-normal. In particular,
8Krishna (2003) shows that the Wilson model generates efficient sequential equilibria, even in asym-
metric auctions. Hong and Shum (2003) extend the Wilson model by relaxing the perfectly diffuse prior
assumption for the common value.
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assume that (log) valuation vi ≡ log(Vi) and (log) signal xi ≡ log(Xi) are distributed as
follows:
vi = ai + v (2)
ai = a¯i + ai , ai ∼ N.I.D.(0, t2i ) (3)
v = m+ v, v ∼ N.I.D.(0, r20) (4)
xi = vi + xi , xi ∼ N.I.D.(0, s2i ). (5)
The valuation for each agent vi is the sum of an idiosyncratic private value ai and a
common value v; ti is the standard error of the private value and r0 that of the common
value. The idiosyncratic signal xi is given by the individual value plus an idiosyncratic
noise term xi with standard error si varying across agents.
Under the assumption of log-normality, the equilibrium bid of agent i at round k
satisfies:
bki ≡ log(βki ) = 1/Aki (xi +Dki xkd + Cki ), (6)
where xkd is the ex-post observable vector of signals from exited bidders and where
Aki , D
k
i , C
k
i are functions of the distributional parameters a¯i, ti,m, r0, si (Hong and Shum,
2003, eq. (12), p. 334).9
9For completeness, we reproduce the closed-form expressions for Aki , D
k
i , C
k
i in the Appendix A.1.
The main difference between Wilson (1998) and Hong and Shum (2003) is that the former assumes a
perfectly diffuse prior on the common value corresponding to r0 =∞, whereas the latter do not.
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This model is well-suited to analyzing the impact of the presence of an informed
bidder on equilibrium bids. In particular, we can rewrite the signal function (5) as:
xi = (a¯i + ai) + (v + siξi), ξi ∼ N.I.D.(0, 1). (7)
Hence, the signal is the sum of a noisy private component (a¯i+ ai) and a noisy estimate
of the common value (v+ siξi). In this light, an informed bidder, i = I, could be thought
of as one whose signal on the common value is precise compared to others:10
si =

0, if i = I,
> 0 otherwise.
(8)
The signal on the common value to an informed bidder is thus the common value itself.
The overall signal xI in (7) however remains noisy since it incorporates a noisy private
signal as well. An analytical evaluation of the effect of restriction (8) is complicated by
the nonlinearities in the distributional parameters found in Aki , D
k
i , C
k
i . Alternatively, we
may resort to numerical approaches to which we now turn.
3.2 A Monte-Carlo Experiment
We conduct a Monte-Carlo experiment to analyze the impact of the informed bidder
restriction (8) on the equilibrium bids (6) (see Appendix A.2 for details). To ensure inde-
pendence to parametric choices, we stochastically generate all the model’s distributional
10Recall that because the distributional parameters a¯i, ti,m, r0, si are known, this implies that the
identity of the informed bidder is also known by other bidders
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parameters at each replication and verify and confirm robustness to the other remaining
ones (see Appendix A.3).
Specifically, for agent i = 1, . . . , N active in bidding round k = 1, . . . , N of Monte
Carlo experiment replication j = 1, . . . T , we define pˆi(i, k) ≡ Median(pi(i, k, :)) as the
median of the difference between all agents’ bids with b1(i, k, j) and without b0(i, k, j)
informed bidder:
pi(i, k, j) ≡ b1(i, k, j)− b0(i, k, j), ∀i, k = 1, . . . N (9)
Figure 1 plots the median premium pˆi(i, k) against the bidding round number k. The
identities i for some bidders are indicated.11 Moreover, we identify the median retirement
bid for the informed bidder which was evaluated at round 18 out of N = 30. We observe
that, for all agents, the median informed bidder premium is positive until the informed
bidder retires from the bidding process. Specifically,
Result 1 All bids are higher when the informed bidder is actively participating in the
auction.
For those high-value bidders remaining after I has left, the premium is negative and
becomes negligible as we approach the end of the process; for median- and low-value
bidders, the premium is positive until they retire. Furthermore, the premium for the
highest bidders are similar in shape and decline in the intensity of the bids. In addition,
for median- and low-value bidders, the premium increases until they retire. Finally, the
11Recall that bids are re-sorted at each round in descending order. The bidder’s identity should be
interpreted as his position in the sorted bids. Hence, for example, bidder i = 17 at round k = 5 is the
17th highest bid of the remaining N − k = 25 bidders.
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premium is largest for the lowest bidders who retire early on in the bidding process
(located to the left of the graph).
These results are intuitively appealing. The fact that the informed bidder remains
active is interpreted as a good signal on the common value. Consequently, all the partici-
pants bid more aggressively than if he had not been present. However, when the informed
bidder exits, high-value bidders interpret this negatively and the bid is lower than it would
have been otherwise. Eventually, the information from the informed bidder’s decision is
subsumed by the new information as other bidders exit and the two bids become iden-
tical. The fact that the informed bidder premium is highest for low-value-signal bidders
is also intuitive. Since valuation is the sum of a common and private value term, a low
value, on average, corresponds to a low private value. Since these agents comparatively
value the common component more, any information revealed by the informed bidder’s
action is very valuable. The longer the informed agent remains in the bidding process,
the greater the confirmation that the common value might be high.
The more aggressive bidding when the informed bidder I remains active comes about
from the interaction of the winner’s curse and loser’s curse (see also Hernando-Veciana
and Tro¨ge, 2004, on this). The fact that I remains active could be because of a high
common value. Then, an uninformed bidder retiring from the auction incurs a loser’s
curse (“the informed bidder knows that the common value is larger than what the un-
informed bidder thought”). However, I could remain active because of a high private
value; remaining active therefore implies the risk of a winner’s curse (“the informed bid-
der knows that the common value is less than what the uninformed bidder thought”).
Our results indicate that for a wide range of parametric specifications, the loser’s curse
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effect is higher, such that bidders are willing to bid more aggressively knowing that the
informed bidder remains active.
A corollary of this observation is that, if I remains active until the end, then the
(N − 1)th bidder will also bid more aggressively and I will end up paying a higher price.
To verify this claim, we therefore compute the informed bidder premium conditional on
I winning the auction, i.e. pi(i = I, k = N, j).12 This corresponds to the difference in
price the informed bidder would have to pay given that he ended up winning the auction.
Figure 3 plots the distribution of premia. It clearly indicates that the premium is, on
average, positive, with a median of 0.0984. This allows us to conclude that:
Result 2 The winning bid is higher when the informed bidder wins the auction.
In the subsequent econometric analysis, we formally test Result 2 using our Mauritian
slave auctions data discussed in Section 2.
4 Empirical analysis
4.1 Methodology
We saw earlier that our data set allowed us to gauge the degree of relation between slave
sellers and buyers. Moreover, we showed that the presence of better-informed bidders
in public auctions resulted in more aggressive bidding from all bidders (Result 1) and a
higher price being paid by the better-informed bidder in those instances where he wins
the auction (Result 2). We now regroup these two to obtain a testable restriction by
making the following two assumptions:
12In our Monte-Carlo experiment, the informed bidder won the auction 395 times out of 5,000
replications.
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Assumption 1 Compared to other bidders, a related bidder has superior information on
the unobservable characteristic(s) of a slave correlated with the slave’s common value.
and
Assumption 2 A related bidder’s identity is known by other bidders.
The first assumption appears realistic. We saw in Table 5 that the vast majority
of related buyers were either the spouse or children of the deceased owner in succession
sales. It would seem natural to suppose that these bidders would have had sufficient time
to acquire privileged information on the slave being auctioned.
The second assumption is also reasonable. The small size of the Mauritian market,
both in its limited number of participants and geographical concentration would make
it likely that bidders would have known each other. It is of course entirely possible that
a related bidder would have preferred to hide the informational content of his bidding
strategy by hiring an agent in order to conceal his identity. Again, we do not have access
to the actual bids, only to the winning bid so that we cannot verify the actual impact
of this. Nonetheless, three elements lead us to argue that it probably wouldn’t have
affected our results much. First, from an econometric standpoint, the implications are
that our ”unrelated” variable would have been measured with error (since some related
winners would have been wrongly classified as unrelated). If that classification error
were correlated with the pricing error, then biased estimates would have been obtained.
We indirectly control for this possibility below by instrumenting-out the related variable
without qualitative changes in our results. Second, the notary acts we use were legal
documents; any misrepresentation would have implied serious consequences in terms of
titles of ownership, guarantees, compensation in case of emancipation, . . . . A prospective
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related buyer would have undoubtedly weighted the cost of a higher price by letting his
identity be public against the costs of mis-representation. Finally, given the small size of
the Mauritian market, it appears doubtful that such hiding strategies would have been
successful.
The direct consequence of combining Assumptions 1 and 2 with Results 1 and 2 is
straightforward. If the related buyer acquires the slave at the end of the bidding process
and if other bidders believe his actions are somehow motivated by a high common value,
then the price paid by the related buyer will be higher, reflecting the informational asym-
metry. Clearly if information is perfectly symmetric across bidders and/or if the slave’s
value to the related bidder is purely private, the latter’s actions should be inconsequential.
More formally, let ws denote whether the winner of the auction for slave s is related
(ws = 1), or not (ws = 0). We are interested in testing if ws has some predictive power for
the winning bid ps ≡ log(Ps).13 If f denotes some probability function and Xs a vector
of exogenous variables which explain the winning bid, then we say there is no residual
information asymmetry if ws has no predictive power for ps:
f (ps |Xs, ws) = f(ps |Xs). (10)
Assuming a simple hedonic price function we have that:
ps =Xsβ + ws γ + εs. (11)
13Note that the notarial acts document the winner of the auction but not the sequence of bids.
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where β and γ are parameters and εs is an error term. A test of the null hypothesis of
no residual information asymmetry is then simply a test of H0 : γ = 0.
However, ws is potentially correlated with the unobservable characteristics of the
slave and ordinary least square estimates of the parameters in (11) could be biased. One
approach is to find a valid instrument for ws which is not correlated with the error term
εs. Letting Zs denote the vector of explanatory variables which determine whether the
winner of the auction s is a related buyer and νs a mean-zero normally distributed random
error term, we have that:
ws =

1 if νs > −Zsθ
0 if νs < −Zsθ
(12)
In other words, a related buyer wins the auction if there are net positive benefits for him
or her.
The vector of explanatory variables Zs must contain identifying variables which are
correlated with ws but are not correlated with the error term in (11). Assume the winning
bid should reflect the expected lifetime productivity of the slave. In this case, variables
which do not measure the slave’s productivity and which appear in the notarial act should
not influence the value of the winning bid. One such possible identifying variable is the
number of heirs: ceteris paribus observing more or fewer heirs should not affect a slave’s
productivity. However, if there are more heirs, one of them would be more likely be
willing or would have the means to buy the slave. As a result, we use the number of heirs
as an instrument for the related-buyer variable.
For robustness reasons we extend our empirical analysis to the tests for residual infor-
mation asymmetry proposed by Chiappori and Salanie´ (2000) and Dionne et al. (2001)
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in the context of insurance markets. An adaptation of the Chiappori and Salanie´ (2000)
test means we would have to simultaneously estimate (12) and
ps =Xsβ + ηs.
A correlation between ws and ps given, Xs, would then be equivalent to νs and ηs being
correlated. Moreover, Dionne et al. (2001) point out that (10) is equivalent to:
f (ws, ps |Xs) = f (ws |Xs) f (ps |Xs) . (13)
This additional relationship shows the symmetry in ws and ps of the conditional indepen-
dence in our context. In a parametric formulation of winning auction prices distribution,
as given by (11), the conditional independence between ws and ps, given Xs, is obtained
when γ = 0 in (11). Nonetheless, the null hypothesis of no residual information asym-
metry can be rejected because (11) is mis-specified. Dionne et al. (2001) show that one
way to avoid this problem is to add the conditional expectation of ws as an explanatory
variable in (11). In our case, using (11) this means we should estimate:
ps =Xsβ + wsγ + E(ws|Zs)δ + εs, (14)
where E is an expectation operator and δ is a parameter. Again, a test of the null
hypothesis of no information asymmetry can be devised as a test for H0 : γ = 0.
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The control variables inXs that we include are mainly determined by the availability
of data, existing literature and likely relevance. They can be separated between slave-
specific characteristics, sale-specific components and timing elements:
• Slave-specific characteristics:
– Age: We expect the usual concave relationship between age and prices that is
well documented in the literature;
– Gender: As shown in the primary statistics, there appears to be a significant
premium for male slaves;
– Ethnicity: Chenny et al. (2003) showed that the ethnicity of the slave had
a strong influence on prices, most likely through its impact on resistance to
illness, physical strength, . . . ;
– Occupation: As a sizeable share of slaves were employed in skilled work, we
expect a premium on this variable;
• Sale-specific characteristics:
– Presence of children: Children, who under Code Noir had to be sold with
their mother, should increase the price. As found by Chenny et al. (2003), we
expect a different impact depending on the age of children involved.
• Timing elements:
– Years: As can be see in Figure 4, prices displayed considerable medium-term
movements across years, peaking at about 1830. We plan to capture those
movements through time dummies.
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– Semesters: As most slaves were involved in agricultural activities, a seasonal
component to slave demand is expected.
Since related buyers were found to be almost completely absent from voluntary sales,
we focus on involuntary sales (bankruptcy + succession). From the original sample of
4,286 slaves, we are left with 1,812 sales for which the information in all the variables
(winning bids, related bidder, slave characteristics, motivation for sale) is complete, and
1,212 cases where in addition, we have the information on the number of heirs which is
used as instrument.14 The omitted data from the original sample was mainly caused by
illegible handwriting or acts that were too deteriorated to be readable. As these were
likely purely random events, there is no reason to suspect systematic under-reporting and
sample selection bias.
4.2 Results
The results of the multivariate tests for information asymmetry are reported in Table 6.
For the sake of comparison with the literature we start with the OLS estimates of the
price equation without conditioning on the information of the buyer. We then augment
that equation with a dummy variable which captures the identity of the buyer (related
or unrelated). This varable is significantly positive.
As discussed in Section 4.1, observing that a buyer is related to the seller is likely to
be correlated with the unobserved characteristics of the slave. Indeed, the Durbin-Wu-
Haussman test strongly rejects the null hypothesis that the related buyer is exogenous
14Since the owner was, by definition, alive at the time of the auction, the number of heirs is unlikely
to have been listed in voluntary sales, a further reason why we choose to focus on involuntary sales only.
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with a value of 10.76 and a p-value of 0.001. We therefore estimate the price equation
by two-stage least squares (2SLS) where the number of heirs is used as the instrument.
Once again, a related buyer pays a significantly positive premium. However, given that
relatedness between the buyer and the seller is measured by a dummy variable, it may
be inappropriate to use 2SLS. We therefore estimate the system of equation by full in-
formation maximum likelihood (FIML) without any qualitative change in the results.
Both sets of estimates strongly reject the hypothesis that related buyers pay the same
price as unrelated ones. The tests drawn from Chiappori and Salanie´ (2000) also support
residual information asymmetry in the market. The correlation of the residuals between
the error term of the probit equation for whether the buyer is related or unrelated and
the error term of the price equation equals 0.098 with a p-value of 0.001. The results
obtained by using the specification advocated by Dionne et al. (2001), equation (14),
which are reported in the last column of Table 6 (DGV), indicate that related buyers pay
a statistically significant premium compared to unrelated ones.
Hence, all the tests strongly reject the null hypothesis that a related buyer does not
pay a premium when buying a slave. In other words, the presence of a related buyer
with superior information leads to higher equilibrium prices, consistent with Result 2.
Based on the FIML point estimates, we can estimate the related buyer premium at 23%
(0.373/E(Informed)−1), i.e. a related buyer would have ended up paying close to 1/4th
more for a slave, controlling for slave characteristics and the timing of the sale. From
our theoretical analysis of auctions, we attribute this significant premium to the more
aggressive bidding from unrelated bidders when a related bidder was trying to acquire the
slave, and, consequently, to the higher price a related bidder would have to pay to acquire
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the slave. This interpretation would be consistent with strong informational asymmetries
between the two groups.
A valid concern may be that some situations where a related buyer ended up purchas-
ing the slave could correspond to competition among many related bidders that would
push up the prices. In this case, higher prices for related buyers would not be the result of
positive signals to unrelated bidders. Since we have no information on the actual bidding
process, it is not possible to verify whether or not these instances may have taken place.
However, it is doubtful that only related bidders would have participated in the auction.
Monte-Carlo simulations with many informed bidders and uninformed ones reveal that
those cases would only re-enforce the signalling effect of related bidding.15 Uninformed
bidders seeing many informed bidders compete for a slave would rightfully conclude that
not all of these bids could be motivated by high private value alone, and would revise
upwards their Bayesian estimate of the common value of the slave, and increase their
bids even further.
Similarly, the relationship between a seller and a related bidder raises a possibility of
market manipulation. For instance, a group of heirs might collude to simulate interest
in a particular slave so as to raise prices, dropping out of the auction process at the last
moment. In our setting however, the market manipulation argument does not apply since
the related buyer actually ended up purchasing the slave.
Turning to the other variables, it is of interest to note that the additional determinants
of the price of a slave are consistent with priors and/or with the literature. First, the
number of heirs significantly increase the probability that a related bidder will end up
15These simulations can be obtained upon request.
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buying the slave. We attribute this effect to an increased likelihood that one of the heirs
will have both the desire and financial means to acquire the auctioned slave.
Second, we find the expected correlation between determinants of physical strength
and productive capacity. We identify a concave relation between age and price. A slave
was most highly priced at age 24.4, which is very close to the estimates reported in the
literature for the U.S. (Kotlikoff, 1979) and Peru (Newland and San Segundo, 1996).
Also, a male slave fetched a premium of 10% compared to a female one. This estimate
confirms findings that Mauritian female slaves were sold at a discount, reflecting lower
labor productivity rather than reproductive potential (Scarr, 1998, p. 161). Interestingly,
our estimated male premium is the same as the one found for the Southern US Kotlikoff
(1979), very close to that for Jamaica (12% in 1817, Higman, 1976, p. 192) and close
to the lower estimates for the West Indies (10% to 25%, Ward, 1988, fn. 60, p. 34).
Unsurprisingly, handicapped slaves imposed a hefty discount. Moreover, we also find
a significant discount on non-native slaves; all slaves other than Creoles were sold at a
discount, in particular Indian slaves who were considered as of smaller size and lower
strength compared to African-born slaves. The premium on Creoles most likely reflect
better adaptability to the conditions on the island.
Third, our estimates further confirm that children purchased with their mother were
highly valued. Kotlikoff (1979) also finds that slave bundle prices increase with the age
of children for the New Orleans market. Low birth rates and high mortality at birth
(Benedict, 1980; Valentine, 2000) are possible explanations of this high child premium.
Moreover, the premium for children who are older than five is higher than for those who
are at most five. This difference may reflect the high mortality rates of younger children
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and output lost when a female is caring for a young infant (Barker, 1996, p. 95). Finally,
human capital was valued positively: skilled slaves fetched a premium of 17% compared
to agricultural slaves and of 13% compared to household slaves. These premia are lower
than those in the US and Peru, but similar to those for Cuban slaves.16
Finally, our estimates reveal a significant time variation in slave prices. We identify
a clear concave pattern with average prices peaking in 1829 and falling thereafter (see
Figure 4). Note however that seasonality does not appear to be a major factor; all
loadings on quarters during which the sale takes place are insignificant.
4.3 From information asymmetry to adverse selection?
As mentioned earlier, informational asymmetry is necessary, but not sufficient for adverse
selection. Our results unambiguously indicate that the former was present and thus that
the latter was potential. In order to gain further insight on this issue, we follow the
literature in focusing on the motivation for the sale.
Pritchett and Chamberlain (1993) argue that it is unlikely that succession sales were
motivated by hidden defects of the slaves. The death of the owner is a random event,
uncorrelated with the quality of his slaves. As such, succession sales would probably
be the least subject to adverse selection and the price would be more closely aligned
with the productive capacities inferred from the slave’s observable characteristics. In
comparison, slave owners should be inclined to voluntarily sell slaves with unobservable
defects (propensity to flee, to illness, low work intensity, . . . ). Contrary to a succession,
16Kotlikoff (1979) for the US and Newland and San Segundo (1996) for Peru find a skill premium
varying between 43 and 46%. Bergad et al. (1995), pp. 72-77, report that a 1819 Cuban field hand sold
for 467 Spanish pesos, whereas a carpenter sold for 525.
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voluntary sales did not involve the forced liquidation of all assets. Low-productivity
slaves might therefore have been brought to the auction, with high-productivity ones
retained by the owners. This suggests that adverse selection would have been the most
severe in voluntary sales and the least severe in succession sales. Consequently, slaves
sold voluntarily should fetch lower prices than those who are sold during succession sales.
To test this hypothesis, we follow Greenwald and Glasspiegel (1983) in distinguishing
between prime-aged field slaves who are aged 15 to 35 and work as laborers (pioche), from
other slaves, in order to reduce heterogeneity. The t-tests for equality of prices between
voluntary and succession slaves are reported in the top panel of Table 7. We strongly
reject the null hypothesis that both are equal for the whole sample and when we consider
the 1825-1830 and 1831-1835 sub-periods. Prime-aged slaves sold during succession sales
earn a premium of 45% compared to those sold voluntarily. Our premium is much higher
than the 10% computed by Pritchett and Chamberlain (1993), Table 1, in New Orleans
between 1830 and 1860, a value they find is not statistically different from 0.
We might therefore be tempted in concluding that adverse selection was indeed present
in the Mauritian slave market. However, a more careful analysis of the voluntary and
involuntary sales sub-samples suggests a different interpretation. From Table 5, we found
earlier that related buyers are almost completely absent from voluntary sales. Indeed
from the 21 out of 221 occasions in which a slave was purchased by a related buyer,
14 were actually buy-backs from the original owner who was either dissatisfied with the
bids, or had to cancel a former sale due to hidden defects. Put differently, differences in
prices between the two markets were likely caused by self - rather than adverse selection.
Related buyers were simply more present in succession sales than in voluntary sales. As
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our previous theoretical and empirical results show, their sole active presence would have
been sufficient to induce more aggressive bidding in involuntary sales. The findings of
Pritchett and Chamberlain (1993) that prices were not different could be explained by
such differences in samples composition. Related bidders could have been present in both
markets, and/or their informational impact could have been diluted in the larger, and
geographically more extended New Orleans market. Additional data would be required to
provide a more definitive answer to this question, an issue which we leave on the research
agenda.
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Appendix
A Overview of the Wilson (1998) model
A.1 Closed-form equilibrium bids
For completeness, we reproduce the closed-form expressions for the Bayesian-Nash equi-
librium bids from Hong and Shum (2003). The distributional assumptions governing
value and signals can be written as:
vi
x
 ∼ N.I.D.

µi
µ∗
 ,
σ2i σ∗′i
σ∗i Σ
∗

 (15)
where x is the N × 1 signal vector, with:
• xkr is the (N − k) × 1 vector of unobserved signals after k bids have occurred and
k bidders have exited and xkd is the k × 1 vector of observed signals;
• Σ∗−1k,1 is the (N − k) × N partition of the inverse of the covariance matrix in (15)
corresponding to the N − k remaining bidders. Σ∗−1k,2 is the k ×N partition corre-
sponding to the k bidders who have exited;
• lk is the N − k unit vector, µk ≡ (u1, . . . uN−k)′, Γk ≡ (σ21, . . . σ2N−k)′ and Λk ≡
(σ∗1, . . .σ
∗
N−k).
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Define:
Ak ≡ (ΛkΣ∗−1k,1 )−1lk; (16)
Ck ≡ 1/2(ΛkΣ∗−1k,1 )−1(Γk −Diag(ΛkΣ∗−1Λ′k) + 2µk − 2ΛkΣ∗−1µ∗); (17)
Dk ≡ (ΛkΣ∗−1k,1 )−1(ΛkΣ∗−1k,2 ). (18)
Take the ith row of each and substitute in (6) to obtain the optimal bids.
A.2 Monte-Carlo experiment details
We select a number of participants (N = 30); distribution laws for the fixed parameters
(U(0, 1)); and a number of iterations (T = 5000). In accordance with the model, the
error terms are drawn from Gaussian distributions. Then, at each iteration j = 1, . . . T
we:
1. generate the fixed parameters a¯i, ti,m, r0, si from U(0, 1);
2. generate the errors process ai , v, xi from a Gaussian distribution corresponding to
the generated scedastic structure in step 1;
3. use (6) to compute the equilibrium bids for each bidder i, at each round k and for
each iteration j, first without b0(i, k, j) and then with an informed bidder b1(i, k, j).
Finally, we compute the informed bidder premium pi, defined as the difference between
all agents’ bids with and without informed bidder:
pi(i, k, j) ≡ b1(i, k, j)− b0(i, k, j), ∀i, k = 1, . . . N
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We subsequently focus on the median premium pˆi(i, k) ≡ Median(pi(i, k, :)) to obtain the
desired prediction for the empirical part of our study.
The number of participants is arbitrarily set at 30 (we verify robustness to that choice
below). Moreover, the parameters of the model are generated at each iteration. This en-
sures that our results are not dependent on a specific parameter set, but are robust
to very general parametric specifications. In addition, we resort to variance reduction
techniques (antithetic variates) to augment precision, such that our results actually cor-
respond to a much larger number of replications than T = 5, 000. Also, the identity of
the informed bidder is arbitrarily chosen such that he sometimes wins the auction and
sometimes doesn’t. Finally, in Appendix A.3 we check for the robustness of our results
by sequentially changing the number of participants and the distributional laws for the
fixed distribution parameters.
A.3 Robustness check
In Figure 2, we consider comparative statics exercises where we successively change the
assumptions generating the fixed parameters. For this analysis we focus exclusively on the
maximum bid. Since bids are ordered in descending order, this corresponds to pi(1, k, j) ≡
b1(1, k, j) − b0(1, k, j). First, in panel A we increase a¯i → 5 × a¯i,∀i. This implies that
the mean private value component of total value becomes more important relative to the
common value and that the mean total value and signal are also higher. Conversely, the
variances of both value and signal remain unaffected. The impact is to shift outwards the
informed bidder premium which becomes more important. Second, in panel B we increase
m→ 5×m. This results in an increase in the mean common value, with variances again
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unaffected. This variable has no apparent impact on our benchmark results. An increase
in a¯i raises the mean levels of high-value bidders more than those of low-value bidders.
In comparison, an increase in m has an uniform effect on all bidders’ mean valuation.
Consequently, the effect on the highest value bidder is greater than in the second case.
Third, in panel C, we increase ti → 2 × ti,∀i, thereby increasing the variance of the
private component of both total value and signal, while means remain unchanged. This
results in lowering the premium, which nonetheless remains positive. Bidders become
more uncertain regarding the informed bidder’s private value; the latter could remain
active because of a large private value which is irrelevant to other bidders, i.e. the
winner’s curse risk is greater. Fourth, in panel D we increase r0 → 2× r0. This raises the
standard error on the common value. This also has a positive impact on the premium,
since agents are more uncertain concerning the mean common value. Any signal inferred
from the informed bidder’s action is therefore more valuable.
Fifth, in panel E we increase si → 2 × si,∀i so as to increase the overall variance of
the signals on common value without affecting the means. This implies that the signals
agents receive become less informative. Consequently the information revealed by the
informed bidder’s decision becomes more important and the premium increases strongly.
Finally, in panel F we increase N → 1.5N . Augmenting the number of participants
from 30 to 45 shifts the informed bidder outwards. It might have been argued that the
informed bidder effect could have been diluted by having more bidders. Our results show
that this is not the case.
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Figure 1: Median Informed Bidder Premium
Note: Each line corresponds to the median informed bidder premium
Median(pi(i, k, :)), where pi(i, k, j) is given in (9) and the premium is cal-
culated for each agent i = 1, . . . , 30, and at each round k. The thick line
corresponds to the maximum bid i = 1 and defines our benchmark case used
in the subsequent comparative robustness analysis.
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Figure 2: Median Informed Bidder Premium: Effects of Parameters
Note: The median informed bidder premium is Median(pi(i, k, :)), where
pi(i, k, j) is given in (9) and the premium is calculated for the maximum
bid i = 1 and at each round k. The solid line corresponds to our benchmark
specification while the dashed line varies one parameter in turn.
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Figure 3: Distribution of Informed Bidder Premium Conditional on I winning the Auction
Note: The informed bidder premium is pi(i, k, j) given in (9). It is calculated
conditional on the informed bidder winning the auction, i.e. i = I, when
k = N .
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Figure 4: Average quarterly slave prices, quantity sold, Mauritius 1825-1835
Note: Solid line is mean quarterly slave prices (left-hand scale). Dashed line
is number of slaves sold during public auctions (right-hand scale).
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C Tables
Table 1: Distribution of sales by notaries
Archive Nb. of auctions Nb. of slaves sold
Num. Notary District Active 25-29 30-35 25-35 25-29 30-35 25-35
NA 42 TOUSSAINT Grand Port 1791-1831 13 13 125 125
NA 63 DUBOR, Louis-Joseph Senoni Port Louis 1819-1830 37 3 40 269 34 303
NA 66 MONTOCCHIO, Jean Charles Flacq 1822-1874 10 6 16 140 78 218
NA 67 JOLLIVET, Yves Isidore Port-Louis 1822-1857 35 43 78 183 511 694
NA 68 BUSSIE´, Jean-Paul Port-Louis 1823-1832 38 24 62 221 182 403
NA 69 ARNAUD, Charles Port-Louis 1823-1833 24 8 32 444 129 573
NA 71 BELIN, Jean Port-Louis 1824-1827 5 5 33 33
NA 72 BONNEFIN, Alexandre Port-Louis 1825-1833 110 41 151 703 142 845
NA 73 BONSERGENT, The´odore Port-Louis 1825-1828 17 17 43 43
NA 74 DEROULLEDE, L. E. Port-Louis 1828-1837 12 33 45 141 148 289
NA 75 GIBLOT-DUCRAY, J. M. R. See note 1 1829-1873 1 14 15 29 85 114
NA 76 MAIGNARD, Louis Charlemagne Port Louis 1830-1839 34 34 197 197
NA 77 ERNY, Ame´de´e See note 2 1831-1837 24 24 271 271
NA 78 BOUIC, Jules Port Louis 1833-1839 41 41 151 151
NA 79 TREBUCHET, Louis Antoine Port Louis 1833-1842 7 7 27 27
Total 302 278 580 2,331 1,955 4,286
Notes
NA Notary Archive number refers to the classification used at the Mauritius Archives.
1. Giblot-Ducray was based in Pamplemousses & Rivie`re du Rempart from 1829 to 1831 and then in
Grand Port & Savanne between 1832 and 1842. He remained active until 1873 but the district after
1842 is not documented
2. Erny was based in Pamplemousses & Rivie`re du Rempart in 1831 and 1832. He then moved to Port
Louis
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Table 2: Comparison with the 1826 partial census
Number of slaves Average age
1826 Census Notarial acts 1826 Census Notarial Acts
Nb. % Nb. % Avg. Std. Dev. Avg. Std. Dev.
All sample 20,467 4,013 25 14.3 28 15.0
Gender
Male 11,671 57 2,724 64 26 14.0 30 14.5
Female 8,762 43 1,521 36 23 14.5 24 15.2
Missing 33
Ethnic group
Creole 10,364 51 2,015 52 17 12.1 19 12.9
Mozambique 5,581 28 995 26 34 10.8 38 9.7
Malagasy 3,666 18 717 19 31 11.3 34 9.9
Indian 669 3 135 3 44 12.6 47 10.4
Missing 424
Note: See Valentine (2000) for a description of the partial 1826 census.
Table 3: Occupation and Ethnicity. Individual slave sales
1825 - 1835 Ethnic group All ethnic
Gender Occupation Creole Mozambique Malagasy Indian Unknown groups
Price Num. Price Num. Price Num. Price Num. Price Num. Price Num.
Female Skilled 108 2 229 8 106 1 196 11
Laborer 378 64 188 49 298 19 109 13 126 5 274 150
Household 345 203 243 36 354 63 197 23 313 20 325 345
Unknown 246 69 149 17 216 16 111 11 219 14 214 127
All 330 338 201 102 313 106 152 48 255 39 288 633
Male Skilled 427 167 349 155 371 152 131 10 411 59 382 543
Laborer 397 196 298 495 315 237 194 22 238 25 318 975
Household 373 210 305 65 405 71 188 33 311 17 350 396
Unknown 305 70 271 93 310 47 261 12 314 58 294 280
All 387 643 305 808 344 507 193 77 337 159 337 2,194
All Skilled 423 169 349 155 364 160 128 11 411 59 378 554
Laborer 392 260 289 544 314 256 163 35 219 30 313 1,125
Household 360 413 283 101 381 134 191 56 312 37 338 741
Unknown 276 139 252 110 286 63 189 23 295 72 269 407
All 367 981 294 910 339 613 177 125 321 198 326 2,827
Notes Average prices are in current piastres (5 piastres = £1 = $4.94US in 1827, Officer (2001)). The
sample is restricted to individual slaves whose gender is known. We exclude heterogenous groups and
mother-child bundles. The following occupations are recorded in the notarial acts are:
• Skilled slaves: Assistant blacksmith, blacksmith, barrel maker, carpenter, carpentry trainee, carter,
commander, locksmith, mason, master carpenter, master mason, mattress maker, nailer, roofer,
sack-maker, sawyer, shoemaker, squarer, stone cutter, stone cutter trainee, sugar-maker.
• Agriculture slaves: Chief gardener, gardener, laborer, marketman, stable-boy, watchman and sea-
related activities: caulker, fisherman, sailor.
• Household slaves: Baker, cook, innkeeper, laundress, maid, messenger, nurse, seamstress, shoe pol-
isher, tailor.
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Table 4: Motivations for the sales
Reasons for the aution
Year Voluntary Bankruptcy Succession Unknown All
1825 9 1 42 1 53
1826 9 37 1 47
1827 6 1 45 3 55
1828 57 11 66
1829 65 14 76
1830 2 41 1 42
1831 1 46 8 55
1832 35 7 41
1833 6 5 29 3 43
1834 19 10 36 15 80
1835 2 3 8 1 14
1825-35 51 23 441 65 572
Year Number of slaves sold by reason
1825 118 51 377 4 550
1826 58 309 6 373
1827 37 28 349 3 417
1828 459 66 525
1829 410 56 466
1830 3 234 53 290
1831 7 454 33 494
1832 168 24 192
1833 12 155 228 43 438
1834 53 124 226 96 499
1835 7 14 17 4 42
1825-35 256 382 3,231 388 4,286
Note Unknown means either the reason is not documented or the condition of the
notarial act did not allow us to identify the reason for the sale.
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Table 5: Related and Unrelated Buyers
Reasons for the sale
Link between the Voluntary Bankruptcy Sucession Unknown Total Share
owner and the buyer
Family 25.7%
Wife 286 286
Husband 9 189 191
Son 1 177 178
Son-in-law 1 76 77
Daughter 69 69
Grand-children 9 9
Nephew and niece 9 9
Brother 3 5 8
Father 8 8
Sister 7 7
Brother-in-law 2 2
Cousin 2 2
Minor children 2 2
Father-in-law 1 1
Mother 1 1
Buy back 1.0%
Original slave owner 14 7 7 28
The slave 2 4 6
0.3%
Tenant 3 3
Business partner 7 7
3.3%
Same last name 3 3 97 2 105
Other 4 4
69.7%
No apparent link 200 314 1,530 260 2,304
Total 221 329 2,488 3,307
Notes
∗ Children sold with their mother are coded as one sale because they could
not be sold, or bought, separately. We exclude group sales of slaves, i.e.
heterogenous bundling of adult slaves.
∗∗ Other informed buyers include: a creditor, husband of the niece of the de-
ceased, the notary, the testament executor (fonde´ des pouvoirs)
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Table 6: Determinants of slave prices: Succession sales only
OLS 2SLS FIML DGV
Log of price log price Buyer log price Buyer log price
Related buyer 0.056** 0.617** 0.373*** 0.064**
2.41 2.354 3.784 2.27
Exp. value of the informed dummy 0.594***
2.93
Number of heirs 0.022*** 0.072***
4.329 5.164
Attributes
Age 0.048*** 0.050*** 0.056*** -0.012** 0.053*** -0.035** 0.056***
10.931 11.139 7.885 2.196 9.071 2.262 6.725
Age squared -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.000* -0.001*** 0.000* -0.001***
16.731 16.836 11.617 1.791 13.34 1.83 8.776
Male slave 0.093*** 0.094*** 0.096** 0.013 0.097*** 0.04 0.096**
3.353 3.378 2.385 0.383 2.676 0.414 2.437
Handicapped -0.537*** -0.538*** -1.036*** -0.305 -1.112*** -5.808
4.421 4.436 2.639 0.908 3.18 0
Ethnicity
Mozambique -0.058* -0.067** -0.124** 0.148*** -0.088** 0.443*** -0.130**
1.852 2.126 2.053 3.639 1.975 3.866 2.345
Malagasy -0.041 -0.045 -0.076* 0.053 -0.066 0.153 -0.078**
1.39 1.506 1.667 1.374 1.628 1.39 2.06
Indian -0.413*** -0.421*** -0.412*** 0.08 -0.396*** 0.223 -0.414***
7.006 7.048 4.781 1.086 5.153 1.083 4.037
Mother-child bundling
Num. of children not older than 5 0.242*** 0.242*** 0.269*** -0.048 0.257*** -0.136 0.272***
8.217 8.218 5.483 1.157 5.95 1.136 6.789
Num. of children older than 5 0.389*** 0.388*** 0.356*** 0.034 0.362*** 0.086 0.355***
9.044 9.039 5.567 0.613 6.286 0.552 6.112
Occupation
Laborer and agriculture -0.188*** -0.183*** -0.121** -0.099** -0.143*** -0.283** -0.114**
5.98 5.82 2.256 2.36 3.225 2.417 2.421
Household -0.133*** -0.142*** -0.152** 0.108** -0.124** 0.297** -0.155***
3.802 4.031 2.493 2.33 2.51 2.305 2.806
1826 0.054 0.046 0.045 0.011 0.047 0.074 0.036
1.117 0.951 0.614 0.179 0.704 0.395 0.523
1827 0.380*** 0.375*** 0.242*** 0.126** 0.269*** 0.408** 0.234***
8.536 8.443 3.21 2.055 4.194 2.369 4.031
1828 0.731*** 0.708*** 0.649*** 0.121** 0.680*** 0.375** 0.639***
17.806 16.758 8.952 2.151 11.385 2.309 10.678
1829 0.842*** 0.828*** 0.790*** 0.076 0.820*** 0.251 0.779***
20.118 19.668 11.088 1.349 14.006 1.557 13.536
1830 0.587*** 0.578*** 0.549*** 0.106 0.580*** 0.32 0.538***
11.117 10.9 6.163 1.452 7.611 1.547 7.803
1831 0.313*** 0.290*** 0.195** 0.215*** 0.251*** 0.622*** 0.179**
7.735 7.012 2.277 4.008 4.187 4.003 2.457
1832 0.04 0.021 0.056 -0.002 0.062 0.105 0.05
0.73 0.368 0.668 0.026 0.817 0.507 0.49
1833 -0.159*** -0.163*** -0.099 -0.170** -0.133* -0.563** -0.099
2.839 2.899 1.074 2.28 1.705 2.39 1.137
1834 -0.191*** -0.211*** -0.314*** 0.200** -0.251*** 0.569** -0.327***
2.792 3.068 2.7 2.39 2.806 2.43 3.174
2nd Quarter -0.072* -0.068* -0.045 -0.065 -0.061 -0.134 -0.048
1.961 1.848 0.785 1.355 1.202 0.976 0.978
3rd Quarter -0.005 -0.003 0.006 -0.044 -0.009 -0.078 0.004
0.143 0.083 0.112 0.977 0.19 0.613 0.088
4th Quarter 0.034 0.029 -0.004 0.04 0.005 0.136 -0.008
1.072 0.908 0.082 0.941 0.113 1.146 0.178
Constant 5.120*** 5.090*** 4.787*** 0.390*** 4.905*** -0.393 4.772***
59.286 58.323 26.751 3.462 39.539 1.249 28.305
Number of observations 1812 1797 1212 1212 1212 1210
R-squared 0.579 0.58 0.421 0.097
Notes Related buyer is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the buyer and the orignal slave owner are
related and zero otherwise (see Table 4). The reference categories are: skilled workers for occupation (see
Table 3 for the full list of occupations); creoles for ethnicity, 1825 for the year and the first quarter for
semester. We use only succession sales from 1825 to 1834 in estimating the model. The lack of data prevents
us from using sales for 1835.
The Durbin-Wu-Hausman Chi-Squared statistic for the null hypothesis that Buyer is informed is exogenous
equals 10.76 and the corresponding P-Value is 0.001. Absolute value of T-ratios corrected for heteroscedas-
ticity are reported under the point estimate; * denotes the parameter is significantly different from zero at
10%; ** significant at 5% and *** significant at 1%.
DGV denotes the specification based on Dionne, Gourieroux and Vanasse 2001
Table 7: Differences in slave prices, succession vs voluntary sales
Succession & voluntary sales Succession sales Voluntary sales T-test Premium
Avg. price Nb. of obs Avg. price Nb. of obs
All males
1825-1835 355 1,598 247 146 9.22 44%
1825-1830 400 1,080 267 117 9.81 50%
1831-1835 259 518 163 29 5.90 59%
Prime-aged field slaves 334 687 231 61 6.58 45%
Note: A prime-aged field slave is a male of age 15 to 35 who works in agriculture (pioche or other
agricultural related tasks). Price is in piastres. The T-test is for the null hypothesis that prices for related
and unrelated buyers (top panel), succession and voluntary sales (bottom panel), are equal.
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